But first a lighter fare: Schlock-talker Michael Savage lays into Islam, in a seriously scary way, and doesn't get the Imus routine as a result. Why? Because he laid into Islam, and America right now is afraid of Islam, even if most Muslim-Americans are law-abiding moderates (as are most [insert major group]-Americans).
I hope other minorities are helping Muslim-Americans fight back. Michael Savage was already a grade-A jerk, but his bizarrely fever-pitched screed against Muslim-Americans set a new standard for quasi-mainstream Islamophobia.
Just ask yourself, seriously: Would any on-air personality be allowed to say the same things (that we should deport all of them, that they should shove their religion up their behinds) of Jews, Christians, Buddhists, or atheists? He wasn't talking about jihadis - he was talking about all Muslims, a pretty big group.
Anyway, Culture Project's upcoming play Betrayed by New Yorker writer George Packer looks at how the U.S. military and the Bush people essentially betrayed many of the Iraqi interpreters and other aides they hired.
The play's fantastic (we've had a few readings) and Packer's nonfiction accounts of his time in Iraq - ranging from The Assassin's Gate to the article that inspired the play - is definitely worth reading.
But it saddens me to read, in today's New York Times, just how venerable our history of abandoning our allies really is. Short version: To fight communism in Laos and Vietnam, the CIA hired thousands of Hmong warriors (from Laos), then abandoned them when the communists won. The U.S. troops came home, in various states of disrepair. The Hmong were already home, and their socialist government couldn't have been more pissed at them.
Cut to thirty years later. The former fighters are aging; their families now guilty by relation. They move around every few weeks, hiding, and endure irregular skirmishes with the Laotian army. The government of Laos denies that ex-CIA Hmong exist in the jungles, blaming such rumors on "bandits." The Times's pictures prove otherwise.
Also not fun: Iraqi Associated Press photographer Bilal Hussein was held by U.S. forces for twenty months without being charged with a crime, then released into the care of an Iraqi magistrate. The magistrate will determine whether or not Hussein is an insurgent. He has still not been charged.
Hussein's lawyers "were not given a copy of the materials that were presented and which they need to prepare a defense." The AP has fought vigorously for Hussein, with little luck. The military says Hussein helped insurgents. But Hussein hasn't been charged with that crime or with any other.
Showing posts with label U.S. troops. Show all posts
Showing posts with label U.S. troops. Show all posts
Monday, December 17, 2007
Sunday, December 16, 2007
David Lindorff
...from earlier today, sings with his daughter about Iraq. "It's one, two, three - what are we fighting for? ... Five, six, seven - open up the pearly gates..." A charming ditty, I suppose.
[I'm told the song is a version of a Country Joe McDonald song with the refrain, "Don't give a damn, / next stop is Vietnam."
And then a short intermission. The technical director appears on the live-feed, moving mic stands around. The house is almost too packed to move through.
[I'm told the song is a version of a Country Joe McDonald song with the refrain, "Don't give a damn, / next stop is Vietnam."
And then a short intermission. The technical director appears on the live-feed, moving mic stands around. The house is almost too packed to move through.
Monday, November 26, 2007
Torture Short Play
Before the panel, a short reading with four actors. I can't quite make out the un-microphoned voices. Here's what I'm getting: A tank drove over a car, making an Iraqi man late. The man was jailed under Saddam for not reporting another man who disparaged the leader. His brother (Khalil, like Gibran) went to England to study poetry. Another voice questions the man about his allegiances. More American voices, threatening the man ("people like you") with prison time for not passing a polygraph. Confusion among the Americans about the existence of a database with information on suspects. The information can't be proven accurate - the U.S. is paying informers who'll sell out anyone, who run to Syria. Informers send people to jail, then blackmail the families into paying for help getting those innocents out of jail. Marine grenade-fire outside. Lots of talk of Wonderland and rabbit holes... (If only Carroll was writing the war - we'd be fighting bitchy cards instead of a combination of various extremists ranging from Sunni to Republican.)
Sunday, August 19, 2007
New York Times Op-Ed Worth Reading:
August 19, 2007
Op-Ed Contributors
The War as We Saw It
By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY
Baghdad
VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)
The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.
A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.
As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.
Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.
However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.
In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.
Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.
Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.
The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.
Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.
Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.
At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.
In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”
In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.
Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.
We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.
Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.
Op-Ed Contributors
The War as We Saw It
By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY
Baghdad
VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)
The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.
A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.
As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.
Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.
However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.
In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.
Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.
Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.
The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.
Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.
Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.
At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.
In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”
In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.
Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.
We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.
Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.
Thursday, June 28, 2007
Protest to Close Guantánamo
Culture Project sends much love to our friends at the Living Theatre (Not In My Name, No Sir!), who are currently staging protests and protest-performances of their latest show, The Brig. Their aims are to close Guantánamo and end the war in Iraq. Details via www.livingtheatre.org. IN short:
THE BRIG @ Ground Zero -Join us to demonstrate our refusal to be complicit in this unjust war.
Two free street theatre performances of THE BRIG
Ground Zero: Church Street (at entrance to PATH train)
Sunday, July 1st, 4 PM
Wednesday, July 4th, 2 PM
The Living Theatre - 212 792 8050 - www.livingtheatre.org
From Living's letter about the protests:
"I don't have to tell you guys about the worsening situation in Iraq, or Afghanistan. Our banners say: Support the troops AND Stop the war. We are inviting lots of friends and reaching out to other groups. We believe also that some press will be there, and some 'friends' from the other side."
Tuesday, June 26, 2007
Shame On Colonel Morris Davis
The New York Times today published a rebuttal not only of justice but of moral practice in its most forgiving sense.
The article, an op-ed piece by Morris Davis, an Air Force lawyer, generously and insipidly defends the existence of and practices within America's Guantánamo Bay detention facility.
Culture Project does not stand for everyone. But many, many people stand with us in our fight to close Guantánamo, now, and to end the Bush regime's suspension of habeas corpus ("Latin: [We command that] you have the body") that has kept hundreds of men locked in cages in Cuba, wondering why they are there and when they are going to go home, go to jail, or even die.
The questions we continue to have with regard to Guantánamo and all attendant persons and practices are not, are emphatically not: "Are the prisoners kept there particularly comfortable; do they have the Qur'an [not 'Koran,' Mr. Davis]; are their meals hot enough, fibrous enough, etc.?"
The lingering question that we have is this: Is it right to keep men detained for indefinite periods of time without charging them, in a foreign country, on the pretext that they are or may be "terrorists" or "enemy foreign combatants" or some other jargon, as opposed to ordinary, respectable criminals? If a man commits a crime - if the government thinks a man commits a crime - that man should be jailed, according to the rule of law, and given a swift and fair trial. He should not be detained forever in another country, no matter how hot his meals are (now, after our play and others like it and a general shitstorm of media attention).
Mr. Davis seems uninterested in justice in the grand, ideal, popular sense - the sense of "justice" that we think many of you out there are most interested in. Not the justice of which Geneva Conventions article specifies what number of hot meals must be provided for which class of "enemy combatant," but the kind of justice that would never hold so many men without trial for so long.
It is right that the United States should respect international law regarding the detention of prisoners. It is more right that we should not detain them indefinitely, caged like dogs, and call ourselves heroes for closing Camp X-Ray five years ago, or for admitting that not every inmate is guilty, or for handing out Qur'ans.
From wikipedia and MSNBC.com:
Most of the detainees still at Guantánamo are not scheduled for trial. As of November 2006, according to MSNBC.com, out of 775 detainees who have been brought to Guantánamo, approximately 340 have been released, leaving 435 detainees. Of those 435, 110 have been labeled as ready for release. Of the other 325, only "more than 70" will face trial, the Pentagon says. That leaves about 250 who may be held indefinitely.
The article, an op-ed piece by Morris Davis, an Air Force lawyer, generously and insipidly defends the existence of and practices within America's Guantánamo Bay detention facility.
Culture Project does not stand for everyone. But many, many people stand with us in our fight to close Guantánamo, now, and to end the Bush regime's suspension of habeas corpus ("Latin: [We command that] you have the body") that has kept hundreds of men locked in cages in Cuba, wondering why they are there and when they are going to go home, go to jail, or even die.
The questions we continue to have with regard to Guantánamo and all attendant persons and practices are not, are emphatically not: "Are the prisoners kept there particularly comfortable; do they have the Qur'an [not 'Koran,' Mr. Davis]; are their meals hot enough, fibrous enough, etc.?"
The lingering question that we have is this: Is it right to keep men detained for indefinite periods of time without charging them, in a foreign country, on the pretext that they are or may be "terrorists" or "enemy foreign combatants" or some other jargon, as opposed to ordinary, respectable criminals? If a man commits a crime - if the government thinks a man commits a crime - that man should be jailed, according to the rule of law, and given a swift and fair trial. He should not be detained forever in another country, no matter how hot his meals are (now, after our play and others like it and a general shitstorm of media attention).
Mr. Davis seems uninterested in justice in the grand, ideal, popular sense - the sense of "justice" that we think many of you out there are most interested in. Not the justice of which Geneva Conventions article specifies what number of hot meals must be provided for which class of "enemy combatant," but the kind of justice that would never hold so many men without trial for so long.
It is right that the United States should respect international law regarding the detention of prisoners. It is more right that we should not detain them indefinitely, caged like dogs, and call ourselves heroes for closing Camp X-Ray five years ago, or for admitting that not every inmate is guilty, or for handing out Qur'ans.
From wikipedia and MSNBC.com:
Most of the detainees still at Guantánamo are not scheduled for trial. As of November 2006, according to MSNBC.com, out of 775 detainees who have been brought to Guantánamo, approximately 340 have been released, leaving 435 detainees. Of those 435, 110 have been labeled as ready for release. Of the other 325, only "more than 70" will face trial, the Pentagon says. That leaves about 250 who may be held indefinitely.
Monday, June 18, 2007
Another extraordinary New Yorker piece
Sy Hersh has a disturbing article in this week's New Yorker about Abu Ghraib. Though we all know what happened, and have suspected people much higher up knew what was going on and either encouraged it or looked the other way, this piece is eye-opening nonetheless.
Tuesday, April 17, 2007
america at a crossroads
If you haven't yet seen any of PBS's documentary series America At A Crossroads this week, do find the time to watch it or record it.
Last night's interviews with soldiers on different levels of the chain of command, followed by dramatizations of the troops' own writing, was the most down-to-earth, heartbreaking representation of the realities of this war that I've seen yet.
Simply through the words and experiences of U.S. soldiers, without putting on interpretations or using editing to tell a story, the agony of their experience - and the absolute horrors of the Iraqi experience - is palpable.
Tonight Richard Perle is allocated the first hour to jam his foot down his throat. Not to be missed.
Last night's interviews with soldiers on different levels of the chain of command, followed by dramatizations of the troops' own writing, was the most down-to-earth, heartbreaking representation of the realities of this war that I've seen yet.
Simply through the words and experiences of U.S. soldiers, without putting on interpretations or using editing to tell a story, the agony of their experience - and the absolute horrors of the Iraqi experience - is palpable.
Tonight Richard Perle is allocated the first hour to jam his foot down his throat. Not to be missed.
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